Stress testing involves evaluating the impact of extreme scenarios that are not captured by value at risk( VaR \text{VaR} VaR).
Generate scenarios → \to → Test and monitor → \to → Analyze the results
Stress testing estimates how a portfolio, or a financial institution would perform under extreme market moves.
A key question for financial institutions is whether it has enough capital and liquid assets to survive various scenarios.
Senior management recognizes the importance of stress testing and incorporates it into its decision making.
Stress Testing | VaR \text{VaR} VaR and E S ES ES |
---|---|
Forward-looking | Backward-looking |
Doesn’t need a loss distribution | Based on a loss distribution |
A small range of scenarios(all bad) | A wide range of scenarios (good and bad) |
A much longer time horizon | A short time horizon |
Enterprise-wide view of stress testing: the scenarios are defined in terms of macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth rates and unemployment rates.
Suppose the year 2008 is used as the stressed period:
Stressed VaR \text{VaR} VaR: If we had a repeat of 2008, we are X % X\% X% certain that losses over a period of T T T days will not exceed the stressed VaR \text{VaR} VaR level.
Stressed E S ES ES: If losses over T T T days do excess the stressed VaR level, the expected (i.e., average) loss is the stressed.
T T T is a short period (i.e., one to ten days). In contrast, stress testing usually has a longer time horizon.
Advantages: Stressed VaR \text{VaR} VaR and stressed E S ES ES helps financial institutions to set aside adequate capital when the next stress or shock occurs, taking unexpected losses and stressed environments into consideration.
Disadvantages: Because the inputs are stressed, stressed VaR \text{VaR} VaR and stressed E S ES ES may not be responsive to the current market conditions, and can not be back-tested.
The first step in choosing a stress-test scenario is to select a time horizon. Scenarios lasting three months to two years are more common.
Historical scenarios is assumed that all relevant variables will behave as they did in the past. Sometimes, a moderately adverse situation from the past is more extreme for all risk factors to exercise multiplied by a certain amount.
Stress Key Variables is assume that a large change takes place in one or more key variables.
Ad Hoc Stress Tests: History does not exactly repeat, and management judgments are necessary to generate new scenarios or modify existing ones based on past data.
Construct a model determine how a range of other variables can be expected to behave.
Scenarios (and Ad hoc scenarios) built by emphasizing key variables usually specify only a few key risk factors or the movement of economic variables.
Variables specified in a scenario definition are sometimes referred to as core variables, while other variables are referred to as peripheral variables.
Knock-on effects reflects the impact of how firms (particularly other financial institutions) respond to an adverse scenario.
Reverse stress testing takes the opposite approach of stress testing: It asks the question, “What combination of circumstances could lead to the failure of the financial institution?”
Stress-testing coverage: stress-testing should be applied at various levels (business line, portfolio, risk types, individual exposures or instruments and enterprise-wide basis).
Stress-testing should be conducted over various relevant time horizons.
Capital and liquidity stress testing: we can conduct stress testing for capital and liquidity to analyze how losses, earnings, cashflows, capital and liquidity would be affected.
In the United States, Federal Reserve carries out a stress test of all banks with consolidated assets of over USD 50 billion. This is referred to as the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). Banks are required to consider four scenarios:
Banks must submit a capital plan, documentation to justify the models they use, and the results of their stress tests. If they fail the stress test because their capital is insufficient, they are likely to be required to raise more capital and restrict the dividends they can pay until they have done so.
Banks with consolidated assets between USD 10 billion and USD 50 billion are subject to the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST). The scenarios in DFAST are like those in CCAR. However banks are not required to submit a capital plan.
Governance over stress test
Governance process: determine the extent of the stress testing carried out by a financial institution.
Board of directors:
Senior management:
Policies and procedures
Documentation
Though documenting activities is often not a popular task, it is important so far as it ensures continuity if key employees leave and satisfies the needs of senior management, regulators, and other external parities.
The reviews themselves should be unbiased, and it is important that the reviewers of stress-testing procedures be independent of the employees conducting the stress test.
The review should:
The internal audit assesses the practices used across the whole financial institution to ensure they are consistent.
Finding ways in which governance, controls, and responsibilities can be improved.
Providing advice to senior management and the board on changes it considers to be desirable.
Emphasized the importance of stress testing.
Market risk calculations based on internal VaR and ES models to be accompanied by “rigorous and comprehensive” stress testing.
Internal ratings-based to determine credit risk capital are required to conduct stress tests to assess the robustness of their assumptions.
Rationale for stress testing
Providing forward-looking assessments of risk
Overcoming the limitations of models and historical data
Supporting internal and external communications
Feeding into capital and liquidity planning procedures
Informing and setting of risk tolerance
Facilitating the development of risk mitigation or contingency plans across a range of stressed conditions
Shortcoming prior crisis
The involvement of the board and senior management is important.
The stress-testing methodologies used at some banks did not enable exposures in different parts of the bank to be aggregated.